


ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ANNUAL REPORT, 2015




Investigation Bureau, Ministry of Justice
Republic of China (Taiwan)

ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ANNUAL REPORT, 2015

The Investigation Bureau, Ministry of Justice

Anti-Money Laundering Annual Report, 2015



PREFACE

The development of information and communications technology, financial liberalization, the ascent of digitization, and the tide of globalization have changed the social, political, economic, and cultural aspects of human's life on one hand, but the negative effects such as the increase of cross-border crimes, the diversification of criminal acts, and the rise of high-tech crimes have been derived on the other hand. The severe changes in international political arena and the rampant terrorist activities, especially the abuse of digital communications media, tele-com technology, and financial instruments by terrorists and transnational criminal organizations across the traditional boundaries are posing serious threats to social stability, national security, regional stability, and international peace; these are severe challenges to security, intelligence, and law enforcement operations. In compliance with international standards and easing up the regulatory gap in response to the changing context, this country not only has the Countering Terrorist Financing Prevention Act been promulgated, but the amending of the Money Laundering Control Act is currently being actively promoted. At the same time, the new confiscation provision in criminal law has been enforced as of July 1, this year. The breakthrough and modifications in the legal system is a landmark of reformation and it will cause dramatical changes in the connotations of criminal investigation.

The formation of an anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing (AML/CFT) concept and expansion of subjects to be regulated by this mechanism will inevitably expand the AMT/CFT operation scale of the Investigation Bureau, Ministry of Justice (MJIB). The number of suspicious transaction reports (STRs) filed by financial institutions is expected to increase along with the adjustment of the legal system. As the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of Taiwan, the MJIB will strengthen its financial intelligence network by training the staff of the financial industry as well as non-financial institutions and professions to raise their awareness of AML/

CFT, by supporting the relevant divisions within the MJIB, other domestic judicial and law enforcement agencies in cash flow detection and criminal investigation. Facing up to the new challenging context, the Anti-Money Laundering Division, MJIB continues to enhance its professional competence, to advance its effectiveness of analysis on criminal and money-laundering intelligence, and to initiate its database integration and digitized transmission projects.

Last but not least, the Anti-Money Laundering Division, MJIB dynamically participates in international affair and promotes international cooperation in processing cross-border financial intelligence exchange. It has introduced the international standards of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) to be transformed as domestic specification and endeavoured to promote it to be implemented in this jurisdiction. In preparation for Taiwan to receive the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) Third Round Mutual Evaluation scheduled in 2018, the MJIB held the “2015 Mutual Evaluations Seminar – National Risk Assessment and Targeted Financial Sanctions” and “2015 Anti-Money Laundering Forum for Banking Sector” to provide a communication channel for domestic competent authorities and private sectors to exchange opinions on the policies, regulations, and actual practice of international standards.

Investigation Bureau, Ministry of Justice
Director General



September 2016

E DITORIAL NOTE

I. Purposes

The 33rd Recommendation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 Recommendations amended in February 2012 states “Countries should maintain comprehensive statistics on matters relevant to the effectiveness and efficiency of their AML/CFT (anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing) systems. This should include statistics on the STRs received and disseminated; on money laundering and terrorist financing cases investigated, prosecuted and convicted; on property frozen, seized and confiscated; and on mutual legal assistance or other international requests for cooperation.” Therefore, this Annual Report, 2015 integrates the statistics and analyses of the annual data regarding AML/CFT performed by the Taiwan domestic financial institutions (FIs), law enforcement agencies, judicial authorities, and other competent authorities.

II. Contents

A. This Annual Report, 2015 consists of the following four parts:

1. Introduction on the Organization of Anti-Money Laundering Division (AMLDD);
2. Work Overview (including statistics information and charts);
3. Significant Case Studies;
4. Major Events of the AMLDD in 2015;

B. The statistics and related information of the Annual Report, 2015 are based on the data collected by the AMLDD and cases prosecuted by district prosecutors offices for violating the Money Laundering Control

Act (including deferred prosecutions and petitions for summary judgment).

III. Notes

- A. The years quoted in this Annual Report, 2015 (English version) refer to years of Christ. The numbers of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs), Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs), and International Currency and Securities Transportation Reports (ICTRs) are based on the numbers of reports. The prosecutions in Taiwan district prosecutors offices and judgments at all levels of courts are based on the number of cases. The value of money is calculated in New Taiwan Dollar (NTD). Special cases are noted in corresponding figures (charts).
- B. The percentages referred to herein are rounded off. The round-off may create slight differences between integers and decimals.

IV. This Annual Report, 2015 was compiled and printed in haste. We welcome your precious comments. Should you spot any errors or would like to make suggestions, please have no hesitation to contact us.

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PART ONE

Introduction on the
Organization of AMLD



The lucrative proceeds and wealth originated from serious crimes make it possible for organized crime syndicates to infiltrate all levels of government agencies, legitimate businesses, Financial Institutes (FIs) and different parts of the society. The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances concluded in Vienna in 1988 (Vienna Convention) requires state parties to constitute laws to penalize Money Laundering (ML) associated with drug trafficking. In 1989's Summit of G7 in Paris, the leaders of the states recognized the threats exposed to banking system and to FIs, and contributed to the establishment of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to set out measures to combat ML. Sequentially, the FATF 40 Recommendations on AML, were released in 1990 and amended in 1996, required that the predicate offences of ML should extend to other serious offences besides drug trafficking. Then in 2001, the FATF issued the 8 Special Recommendations on countering terrorist financing (CTF). In 2004, the FATF further strengthened the agreed international standards on AML/CFT(the 40+9 Recommendations). In February 2012, the FATF completed a thorough review of its standards and published the revised FATF Recommendations as "International Standards on Countering Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation".

In response to the global trends to curb the detriment caused by ML, the Taiwan's government drafted the Money Laundering Control Act (MLCA), which was passed by the Legislative Yuan on October 23, 1996 and took effect on April 23, 1997 upon presidential decree. During the past years of implementation and practice, the MLCA underwent amendments in 2003, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 respectively to tackle the practical problems encountered for reacting to the requirements of the FATF Recommendations and the practical need in implementation.

In order to prevent criminals from abusing FIs as a vehicle for ML and to detect major crimes and ML at the point of transactions, AML legislations around the world require all FIs to file suspicious transaction reports (STRs).

Taiwan has a similar reporting mechanism provided in Article 8 of the MLCA. Based on the definition in the related international organizations, an authority responsible for receiving and analyzing STRs is called "Financial

Intelligence Unit” (FIU). In 1997, in accordance with the MLCA, the Investigation Bureau, Ministry of Justice (MJIB) was assigned by the Executive Yuan to receive STRs filed by FIs, and the Money Laundering Prevention Center (MLPC) was established in the same year to act as the Taiwan’s FIU.

In addition, pursuant to Subparagraph 7, Article 2 of the Organic Act of the MJIB passed by the Legislative Yuan on November 30, 2007 and put into practice on December 19 in the same year upon presidential decree, the MJIB is in charge of “ML prevention related matters”. Pursuant to Article 3 of the same Act, the MLPC changed the name to the “Anti-Money Laundering Division” (AML D) and kept on the same functions of Taiwan’s FIU. The AML D currently has 22 staff members. Please refer to Figures A and B regarding the AML D’s organizational structure, mandates and SOP of work. Its budget allocated for 2015 was NTD 2,000,000 plus.

Pursuant to Article 9 of the Regulations for Department Affairs of Investigation Bureau, Ministry of Justice, which was amended on October 17, 2008, the functions of the AML D are as follows:

1. Researching AML strategies and providing consultation in the formulation of relevant regulations;
2. Receiving, analyzing, and processing STRs filed by FIs;
3. Receiving and maintaining currency transaction reports (CTRs) filed by FIs and receiving and processing cross-border transportation of cash and bearer negotiable instruments reports (ICTRs) forwarded by the customs;
4. Assisting other domestic law enforcement partner agencies in matching the AML D database for investigating ML cases and coordinating/contacting with respect to ML prevention operation;
5. Liaison, planning, coordination and implementation of information exchange, personnel training and cooperation in investigating ML cases with foreign counterparts;
6. Compilation and publication of Annual Report on AML work and the management of relevant data and information; and
7. Other AML related matters.



© **Financial Action Task Force (FATF)**

The Group 7 had realized at the 1989 Summit in Paris that the crime of drug-related money laundering poses a serious threat to the banking system and financial institutions. Therefore, the “Financial Action Task Force (FATF)” was organized. FATF was responsible for understanding money-laundering techniques and trends, and checking whether each country had adopted international standards and enacted preventive measures to prevent money laundering from occurring. For establishing a generally applicable anti-money laundering infrastructure dedicated to preventing money laundering perpetrators from taking advantage of the financial system, FATF had Forty Recommendations enacted in 1990, and amended in 1996 and 2003, respectively, in order to grasp the development of money-laundering threat. In response to the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, nine special recommendations for countering terrorism financing were enacted in 2001. The “Anti- money laundering, countering terrorism financing, and the proliferation of weapons international standards” was passed in the General Assembly of the FATF in February 2012 to have the original forty anti-money laundering recommendations and nine special recommendations on countering terrorism financing integrated and amended. In addition, the recommendations on countering the proliferation of large-scale destructive weapons were included.

FATF Member States and FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) members exercise Self-assessment or Mutual Evaluation to ensure the effective execution of the aforementioned recommendations.

Currently, FATF has 37 members (35 members of jurisdictions body and 2 organization members, including Gulf Cooperation Council and the European Commission), 9 Associate Members that are regional anti-money laundering organizations, and 2 observers that can participate in the General Assembly and working group meetings fully.

© **Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)**

According to the amended FATF' Recommendation 20: "If a financial institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing, it should be required, by law, to report promptly its suspicions to the financial intelligence unit (FIU)." According to No. 29 Recommendation: "Counties States should establish a Financial Intelligence Unit that serves as a national center for the receipt and analysis of to handle and analyze suspicious transaction reports and other information relevant related to money laundering, associated predicate offences preceding crimes, and terrorist financing, and for the dissemination of the information with the analysis results of that analysis distributed." The FIU should be able to obtain additional information from reporting entities, and should have access on a timely basis to the financial, administrative and law enforcement information that it requires to undertake its functions properly. Egmont Group that is an international organization organized in accordance with the Financial Intelligence Unit of each country has the Financial Intelligence Unit defined as: "Responsible for handling (or proposing a request with consent) and analyzing the following disclosed financial information, and forwarding it to the national central unit of the competent authorities:

- (i) Suspicious criminal property, or
- (ii) Anti-money laundering information enacted according to the national law and regulations".

According to Paragraph 1, Article 8 of the Money Laundering Control Act: “For the transactions suspected of violating Article 11, financial institutions should confirm the identity of the customer and retain the transaction records; also, should report it to the MJIB.” According to Article 7 and Article 10 of the Money Laundering Control Act: “Financial institutions should report or declare a cash transaction exceeding a certain amount (NT\$500,000, currently) and passengers or transportation service personnel carrying a certain amount of foreign currency and marketable securities (equivalent to US\$10,000, currently) entering and departing the country to the MJIB; therefore, the MJIB is the Financial Intelligence Unit of Taiwan.”

Figure A: The AMLD Organizational Chart





Figure B: Operation flowchart of the Anti-Money Laundering Division



PART TWO

Work Overview



- I. Strategic Research on AML/CFT
- II. Processing the STRs Filed by FIs
- III. Receiving the CTRs Filed by FIs

I. Strategic Research on AML/CFT

A. Participation in Terrorist Financing Prevention Act Draft review

The existing legal system of Taiwan lacked the relevant penal provisions and sanction specifications for financing of terrorist activities that were indicated by the APG, and prompt legislative improvements requested. The MJIB then referred to the international standard recommendations of the FATF and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations to prompt the Ministry of Justice to have the “Terrorist Financing Prevention Act” draft proposed to the Executive Yuan and approved in January 2016. It was then presented to the Legislative Yuan and passed in July 2016 and promulgated by the President for implementation.

According to this Act, the Executive Yuan is in charge of terrorist financing control policy integration, implementation, and supervision. The MJIB is the administrative institution responsible for setting up the terrorist financing control review board to determine mission assignments, reporting patterns, the appointment and announcement of the targeted financial sanction list, the delisting of domestic specified subjects, related punishments against human rights protection, and relevant administrative reliefs. The MJIB had actively participated in the relevant meetings throughout the reviewing period of the Terrorist Financing Prevention Act draft and submitted professional proposals in order to have this Act legislated comprehensively complying with international standards.

The countering terrorism financing activities is clearly regulated in the Terrorist Financing Prevention Act to help people be free from the fear of terrorist threat, to respond to the development of international trends and to fulfill Taiwan’s obligation in countering terrorism.



© Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG)

The APG was established in 1997 and aimed to assist the Member States to accept and fulfill the international standards of anti-money laundering, countering terrorism financing, and anti-proliferation of weapons enacted by the FATF.

Taiwan received the APG mutual evaluation twice in 2001 and 2007, respectively. The mutual evaluation report was approved in the APG annual meeting with high regards on the anti-money laundering mechanism of Taiwan. The MJIB acted as the Financial Intelligence Unit of Taiwan with highest performance evaluation received evidences its excellent performance.

APG currently has 41 Member States, 8 Observer States, and 28 international observer organizations; also, it is an associate member of the FATF. Taiwan is one of the founding Member States of the APG under the name of “Chinese Taipei.” Taiwan may participate in the organizational activities of the FATF as a member of APG.

B. Inviting Secretary General of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) to visit Taiwan

Dr. Gordon Hook, Secretary-General of the APG, and Lindsay Chen, an APG senior expert, were invited by the MJIB to visit Taiwan on March 23~27, 2015. In addition to participating in the “2015 Mutual Evaluation Seminar” arranged by the MJIB, they also visited the anti-money laundering relevant authorities



■ Dr. Gordon Hook, Secretary-General of the APG, meeting with Director General Wang of the MJIB

The MJIB held the “2015 Mutual Evaluations Seminar – National Risk Assessment and Targeted Financial Sanctions” in March 2015 with 180 participants who are responsible for national risk assessment and AML/CFT in the competent authorities and financial institutions. Dr. Gordon Hook, Lindsay Chen, and the representatives from the public sector were invited to give speeches and exchange opinions on national risk assessment and targeted financial sanctions. Dr. Gordon Hook presented a report on the latest mutual

evaluation and gave some advice on the issues of national risk assessment. The seminar was very productive and informative that helped all participants better understand the methodology and procedure of the third round mutual evaluation and effectively identify the priorities of their assignments thereafter.



© Egmont Group

In recognition of the need for developing a FIU network, representatives of 24 nations and 8 international organizations convened at Egmont-Arenberg Palace in Brussels, Belgium on June 9, 1995 and decided to establish the Egmont Group as an important platform for intelligence exchange of law enforcement agencies around the world in order to prevent money laundering through joint effort, in particular, in the scope of intelligence exchange, training, and technology sharing.

Taiwan became a member of Egmont Group in the 6th annual meeting in June 1998; it is currently named “Anti-Money Laundering Division” (AML/D), Taiwan. The Egmont Group currently has 151 Member States. The Member States exchange financial intelligence through a secured network. The AML/D regularly attends the annual meetings as well as working group meetings organized by the Egmont Group, initiates intelligence exchange, and promotes signing the Agreement/Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Financial Intelligence Unit of other countries on AML/CFT in complying with the FATF recommendations and the purpose of Egmont Group. The AML/D has signed the Agreements/MOUs with 38 countries as of the end of 2015.

C. Participation in APG Third Round Mutual Evaluation staff meeting

In preparation for Taiwan to receive the APG third round mutual evaluation in the second-half of 2018, the MJIB continues to invite the authorities to participate in the third round mutual evaluation staff meeting in order to seek a significant achievement; also, the first and second meeting was convened in May and October 2015, respectively.

The third round mutual evaluation staff meeting aims to reach a consensus through discussions among relevant departments; also, to examine national money laundering/terrorist financing risks and threats with the National Risk Assessment Report (NRA) with improvements proposed, and to meet the international standards of the FATF 40 Recommendations through self-assessment and strategies.

D. Holding the AML/CFT Workshop for Banking Sector

Nnational Risk Assessment is the key to the effectiveness on implementation of the FATF 40 Recommendations on AML/CTF. The Taiwan government is actively promoting national risk assessment through the trans-department cooperation mechanism in response to the APG mutual evaluation in 2018. Moreover, understanding the money laundering/terrorist financing risks and threats faced by Taiwan through self-assessment on risk and gap analysis from the aspects of legal system, finance, supervision, law enforcement, and international cooperation is critical to the relevant reviews and strategies.

The Anti-Money Laundering Division, MJIB held the “AML/CFT Workshop of Banking Sector” in December 2014 and the “AML/CFT Mechanism with Risk-based Approach” seminar in December 2015. The responsible persons for anti-money laundering in domestic and foreign banks, Director of the Banking Bureau of the Financial Supervisory Commission, and the Commissioner of the Bankers Association invited to attend. In addition to the presentations, all participants recognized the importance of opinion

exchange meetings with officials of the competent authorities. Representatives from the private sector also expressed the urgent needs for information sharing (such as, the establishment and update of the international anti-money laundering/countering terrorism financing list) with the public sector, identifying risks, understanding the latest international trends, and establishing a more comprehensive anti-money laundering risk control mechanism in order to jointly confront the third round mutual evaluation challenge.



- Opinion exchange between the responsible persons for anti-money laundering of financial institutions and officials of the competent authorities in the seminar.

II. Processing the STRs Filed by FIs

The revised 20th Recommendation of the FATF 40 Recommendations states “If a financial institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing, it should be required, by law, to report promptly its suspicions to the financial intelligence unit (FIU)”. The requirement should be set out in law.

Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the MLCA, any financial transaction suspected of committing money laundering, the financial institutions (FIs) shall ascertain the identity of the customer and keep the transaction record as evidence, and report the suspect financial transaction (STR) to the MJIB. After receiving, the STRs will be filed, screened, analyzed, and disseminated to other functional divisions of MJIB or other competent authorities by the AMLD. In 2015, MJIB received 9,656 STRs. The STRs are compiled statistics and analyzed by FIs, dissemination, region, month, subjects’ age, and value. 94.6% of STRs were filed by domestic FIs, 39.5% of STRs happened in Taipei City, 47.2% of the subjects were distributed between 31 and 60 years old, and 32.7% of the transaction amount was under NTD 500,000. (Please refer to Table 01 to Table 07 and Figure C to E for the statistics and analysis of STRs.)

A. The Statistics of STRs

Table 01: The Statistics of STRs Filed by FIs in 2015

Reporting Entities	No. of Reports
Domestic Banks	9,139
Foreign Banks	24
Credit Cooperative Associations	43
Credit Department of Farmer & Fishermen Associations	14
Securities Brokers	5
Futures Merchants	0
Bills Finance Companies	0
Insurance Companies	59
Postal Service which handles money transactions of deposit, transfer and withdrawal	345
Securities Investment Trust Enterprises	0
Securities Depository Enterprises	20
Credit Card Companies	5
Total : 9,656	

Table 02: The Statistics of STRs from 2011 to 2015

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
No. of Reports	7,514	6,137	6,266	6,890	9,656

B. The Results of STRs Processed by the AMLD

Table 03: The Statistics of STRs Disseminated by the AMLD in 2015

Process	No. of STRs
Disseminated to other functional divisions of the MJIB	960
Disseminated to police agency and other competent agencies	366
Stored in the AMLD database for reference	8,279
I Under analysis	46
International Cooperation	5
Others	0
Total : 9,656	


P.S.: the information in this Table was gathered on June 1, 2016

C. The STRs Distribution by Region

Table 04: The STRs Distribution by Region in 2015

Region	No. of Reports	Region	No. of Reports
Taipei City	3,813	Yunlin County	51
New Taipei City	1,645	Chiayi City	93
Keelung City	46	Chiayi County	20
Yilan County	59	Tainan City	339
Taoyuan City	831	Kaohsiung City	607
Hsinchu City	296	Pingtung County	87
Hsinchu County	184	Hualien County	31
Miaoli County	149	Taitung County	133
Taichung City	1,077	Penghu County	15
Changhua County	240	Kinmen County	2
Nantou County	55	Lianjiang County	0
			Total : 9,656

Figure C: The Map of STRs Distribution by Region in 2015



D. The STRs Distribution by Month

Table 05: The STRs Distribution by Month in 2015


Month	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December
No. of STRs	728	540	633	665	719	792	817	829	815	990	941	1,187

E. The STRs Distribution by Subjects' Age

Table 06: The STRs Distribution by Subjects' Age in 2015

Age group	No. of persons
Under Age 20 (inclusive)	45
Age 21-30	673
Age 31-40	1,516
Age 41-50	1,671
Age 51-60	1,368
Age 61-70	727
Over Age 71	352
Others	3,304
Total: 9,656	

Figure D: The Pie Chart of STRs by Subjects' Age in 2015




¹ Other: refers to companies and non-legal entities.

F. The STRs Distribution by Value

Table 07: The STRs Distribution by Value in 2015

Amount	No. of cases
Below NT\$500,000 (including NT\$500,000)	3,158
NT\$500,000 – NT\$1,000,000 (excluding NT\$500,000)	1,186
NT\$1,000,000 – NT\$3,000,000 (excluding NT\$1,000,000)	1,676
NT\$3,000,000 – NT\$5,000,000 (excluding NT\$3,000,000)	886
NT\$5,000,000 – NT\$10,000,000 (excluding NT\$5,000,000)	1,154
NT\$10,000,000 – NT\$20,000,000 (excluding NT\$10,000,000)	825
NT\$20,000,000 – NT\$30,000,000 (excluding NT\$20,000,000)	284
Over NT\$30,000,000 (excluding NT\$30,000,000)	487
Total: 9,656	

Figure E: The Pie Chart of STRs by Value in 2015



III. Receiving the CTRs Filed by FIs

Pursuant to Article 7 of the MLCA, any currency transaction exceeding a certain amount of money (CTRs), the FIs shall ascertain the identity of customer and keep the transaction records as evidence, and submit the financial transaction, the customers identity and the transaction records to the MJIB. Pursuant to Article 2 of the “Regulations Governing Cash Transaction Reports (CTR) and Suspicious Transaction Reports (STR) by Financial Institutions,” the term “a certain amount” shall mean NTD 500,000 (including the foreign currency equivalent thereof). After receiving, the CTRs will be filed by the AMLD. In addition, according to the Operation Directions of the AMLD (admitted by the MOJ on July 14, 2011), the AMLD assists other Field Stations of MJIB, courts, prosecutors offices, and other law enforcement agencies to access CTRs database.

In 2015, MJIB received 3,934,708 CTRs. Around 77.8% of CTRs were filed by domestic FIs, 74.58% of the transaction amount was between NTD 500,000 and NTD 1,000,000. In 2015, the number of accessing is 113,142. (Please refer to Tab 8 - Table 11 and Figure F for statistics and analysis in details).

A. The Statistics of CTRs


Table 08: The Statistics of CTRs Filed by FIs in 2015

Reporting Entities	No. of cases
Domestic Banks	3,063,336
Foreign Banks	20,315
Credit Cooperative Associations	168,756
Credit Department of Farmers & Fishermen Associations	324,773
Postal Service which handles money transactions of deposit, transfer and withdrawal	347,056
Insurance Companies	10,470
Jewelry Retail Businesses	2
Total : 3,934,708	

Table 09: The Statistics of CTRs from 2011 to 2015

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
No. of cases	3,836,757	3,726,585	3,995,726	4,107,745	3,934,708

Figure F: The Line Graph of CTRs by Value in 2015



B. The CTRs Distribution by Value

Table 10: The CTRs Distribution by Value in 2015

Amount	No. of Reports
NT\$500,000 – NT\$1,000,000 (including NT\$500,000)	2,934,826
NT\$1,000,000 – NT\$3,000,000 (excluding NT\$1,000,000)	852,485
NT\$3,000,000 – NT\$5,000,000 (excluding NT\$3,000,000)	92,825
NT\$5,000,000 – NT\$10,000,000 (excluding NT\$5,000,000)	38,692
NT\$10,000,000 – NT\$20,000,000 (excluding NT\$10,000,000)	8,855
NT\$20,000,000 – NT\$30,000,000 (excluding NT\$20,000,000)	2,393
Over NT\$30,000,000 (excluding NT\$30,000,000)	4,632
Total : 3,934,708	

C. The Statistics of Assisting Law Enforcement Agencies in Accessing CTRs Database

Table 11: The Statistics of Accessing CTRs Database from 2011 to 2015

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
No. of Reports	82,085	120,816	126,515	124,251	113,142

IV. Processing the International Currency and Securities Transportation Reports (ICTRs) Forwarded by Taiwan Customs

The revised 32th Recommendation of the FATF 40 Recommendations states “Countries should have measures in place to detect the physical cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments, including through a declaration system and/or disclosure system. Each State should ensure that the established reporting system or disclosure system can be applied to all entities cross-border transport either carried by passengers or through mail and cargo delivery; however, different systems should be applied for different transport pattern.”

Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 10 of the MLCA, Passengers or service crew on board who cross the border with the carrier and carry the following items shall make declarations to the Customs. The Customs shall report subsequently to the Investigation Bureau, Ministry of Justice: 1. Cash of foreign currency with total amount exceeding a certain amount; 2. Negotiable securities with face value exceeding a certain amount. Pursuant to Article 4 of the Regulations for the Declaration of Carrying Foreign Currencies or Securities by Cross-Border Passengers or Service Crew on Board of Transport and for the Interagency Report by the Customs, the term “a certain amount” shall mean USD 10,000 or foreign currency with equivalent value. In 2015, the number of the ICTRs reported by customs was 27,725. In terms of the declared value, around 76.8% of the ICTRs were under NTD 1,000,000. (Please refer to Table 12 to Table 15 and Figure G for the statistics and analysis of ICTRs.

A. The Statistics of ICTRs Declared by the Passengers to Taiwan Customs

Table 12: The Statistics of Inbound and Outbound ICTRs in 2015

Inbound & Outbound	No. of Reports
Inbound	2,618
Outbound	25,107
Total	27,725

Table 13: The Statistics of ICTRs from 2011 to 2015

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
No. of Reports	8,378	8,726	14,273	18,781	27,725

B. The ICTRs Distribution by Month

Table 14: The ICTRs Distribution by Month in 2015


Month	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December
No. of Cases	1,854	1,906	2,449	2,665	1,988	2,428	3,180	2,589	2,114	2,094	2,456	2,002

C. The ICTRs Distribution by Valu

Table 15: The ICTRs Distribution by Value in 2015

Amounts	No. of Reports
Below NT\$1,000,000	21,297
NT\$1,000,000 – NT\$3,000,000 (excluding NT\$1,000,000)	4,732
NT\$3,000,000 – NT\$5,000,000 (excluding NT\$3,000,000)	727
NT\$5,000,000 – NT\$10,000,000 (excluding NT\$5,000,000)	631
NT\$10,000,000 – NT\$20,000,000 (excluding NT\$10,000,000)	248
NT\$20,000,000 – NT\$30,000,000 (excluding NT\$20,000,000)	38
Over NT\$30,000,000 (excluding NT\$30,000,000)	52
Total : 27,725	

Figure G: The Pie Chart of ICTRs by Value in 2015



- Below NT\$1,000,000 (including NT\$1,000,000) 76.82%
- NT\$1,000,000 – NT\$3,000,000 (excluding NT\$1,000,000) 17.07%
- NT\$3,000,000 – NT\$5,000,000 (excluding NT\$3,000,000) 2.62%
- NT\$5,000,000 – NT\$10,000,000 (excluding NT\$5,000,000) 2.27%
- NT\$10,000,000 – NT\$20,000,000 (excluding NT\$10,000,000) 0.89%
- NT\$20,000,000 – NT\$30,000,000 (excluding NT\$20,000,000) 0.14%
- Over NT\$30,000,000 (excluding NT\$30,000,000) 0.19%

V. The Statistics of the Prosecuted Cases under the Money Laundering Control Act (MLCA)

Through accessing the Prosecution Document Database Enquiring System which is maintained by the MOJ, the AMLD has retrieved 19 cases prosecuted by district prosecutors offices in 2014 under Article 11 of the MLCA, including deferred prosecutions and petitions for summary judgments. The information retrieved included the types of predicate crime, proceeds of crime, typologies of ML, and profiles of defendants. All these information shall be analyzed in order to build the statistics regarding ML overview and trends in Taiwan in 2015. In 2015, there are 27 cases prosecuted under money laundering. A total of laundered money reaches NTD 11,880,544,441 from the cases. (Please refer to Table 16 to Table 21 and Figure H for the statistics and analysis of the prosecuted cases.)

A. The Predicate Offence Types of the ML Cases

Table 16: The Statistics of the Predicated Offence Types of the ML cases and Joint Investigations in 2015


Offence Types	Predicate Offences	MJIB	Prosecutors Offices	National Police Agency	Total
General Criminal crime	Kidnapping for ransom	0	0	1	1
	Subtotal	0	0	1	1
Narcotics crime	Narcotics Hazard Prevention Act	0	0	1	1
	Subtotal	0	0	1	1
Economic crime	Fraud	5	0	6	11
	Banking Act	2	0	2	4
	Securities and Exchange Act	3	0	0	3
	Counterfeit marketable securities	0	0	2	2
	Insurance law	1	0	0	1
	Specific perfidy	1	0	1	2
	Business embezzlement	0	0	1	1
Subtotal		12	0	12	24
Corruption crime	Anti-Corruption Act	0	1	0	1
	Subtotal	0	1	0	1
Total		12	1	14	27

B. The Prosecuted ML Cases Distribution by Value

Table 17: The Prosecuted ML Cases Distribution by ML Value in 2015

Amount	Number of cases
Below NT\$100,000 (including NT\$100,000)	8
NT\$100,000 – NT\$1,00,000 (excluding NT\$100,000)	1
NT\$1,000,000 – NT\$5,00,000 (excluding NT\$1,000,000)	1
NT\$5,000,000 – NT\$10,00,000 (excluding NT\$5,000,000)	6
NT\$10,000,000 – NT\$20,00,000 (excluding NT\$10,000,000)	2
NT\$20,000,000 – NT\$30,00,000 (excluding NT\$20,000,000)	1
Over NT\$30,000,000 (excluding NT\$30,000,000)	8
Total : 27	

Figure H: The Pie Chart of ML Value in the Prosecuted ML Cases in 2015



C. The ML Channels and Methods used in the Prosecuted ML Cases

Table 18: The Prosecuted ML Cases Distribution by ML Channels in 2015

Types of Fls	No. of cases
Banks	25
Other Fls	2
Total : 27	

Table 19: The Prosecuted ML Cases Distribution by ML Methods in 2015

Methods of ML	No. of cases
Dummy accounts	21
Relatives' accounts	3
Illegal payable-through accounts	2
Remittance from abroad	1
Total : 27	

D. The Prosecuted ML Cases Distribution by Region

Table 20: The Prosecuted ML Cases Distribution by Region in 2015

Region	No. of Cases	Region	No. of Cases
Taipei City	4	New Taipei City	2
Kaohsiung City	2	Yunlin County	1
Taoyuan City	1	Chiayi County	1
Taiwan	11	Pingtung County	2
Others	3	N/A	N/A
Total : 27			

E. The Prosecuted ML Cases Distribution by the Defendants' Gender

Table 21: The Statistics of the Defendants' Gender Prosecuted under the MLCA in 2015

Charges	Defendant Types	Gender	No. of Persons
Paragraph 1, Article 11 of MLCA	ML for a Serious Crime Committed by Defendants Themselves	Male	40
		Female	16
		Subtotal	56
Paragraph 2, Article 11 of MLCA	ML for a Serious Crime Committed by Others	Male	18
		Female	34
		Subtotal	52
Total			108

VI. Publicity and Training

A. Promoting Public Awareness of AML/CFT

The MJIB Field Offices not only routinely promote the publicity campaigns of protecting government infrastructure and anti-corruption, but also carried out year-round AML/CFT presentations nationwide. With all these efforts, we firmly believe that the awareness will be deep-rooted in Taiwanese people eventually.



- Colleagues of Taipei City Field Division, MJIB at the “National Taiwan Normal University 2015 Employment and Internship Fair” in the anti-money laundering task campaign



■ Colleagues of Kaohsiung City Field Division, MJIB at the “2015 Festivals of The Ocean” in the anti-money laundering task campaign

B. AML/CFT Capacity Building Training

The revised 34th Recommendation of the FATF 40 Recommendations states:

“The competent authorities, supervisors and SRBs should establish guidelines, and provide feedback, which will assist financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions in applying national measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and, in particular, in detecting and reporting suspicious transactions.” To help the staffs of FIs fully understand the requirements concerning AML/CFT, the indicators of suspicious transactions to improve the quality of filing STRs, the compliance with the MLCA, and media transmission protocols, the AMLD has been providing training programs with lectures and presentations. These programs, upon FIs’ requests, cover the topics of AML/CFT international standards, the MLCA reporting obligations of FIs, case studies and the

emerging trends in AML/CFT. The AMLD instructors have been sharing professional experiences with the participants from FIs and discussing the pros and cons of the reported STRs. With case studies, the patterns of suspicious transactions which were connected with certain crimes, such as underground remittance, stock market manipulation, insider trading, and internet gambling, etc. can thus be further understood and learned as lessons to detect and identify suspicious transactions more effectively in the future.

Table 22: The Statistics of Seminars and Participants Carried out by the AMLD in 2015

Types of FIs		Subtotal	
		No. of Seminars	No. of Participants
Bank	Domestic Bank	41	3,019
	Foreign Bank	1	28
	Local Branches of Mainland China Banks	2	67
The Credit Department of the National Farmers' Association and National Fishermen's Association		2	220
Securities Investment Trust Business		2	117
Securities Firms		4	2,410
Futures Merchants		1	123
Postal Service which handle money transactions of deposit, transfer and withdrawal		5	287
Insurance Companies		23	1,984
Bills Finance Companies		0	0
Other Types		0	0
Total		81	8,255

VII. International Cooperation

A. International Information Exchange

The revised 40th Recommendation of the FATF 40 Recommendations states “Countries should ensure that their competent authorities can rapidly, constructively and effectively provide the widest range of international cooperation in relation to money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing. Countries should do so both spontaneously and upon request, and there should be a lawful basis for providing cooperation. Countries should authorize their competent authorities to use the most efficient means to cooperate. Should a competent authority need bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements, such as a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), these should be negotiated and signed in a timely way with the widest range of foreign counterparts.” and “Competent authorities should use clear channels or mechanisms for the effective transmission and execution of requests for information or other types of assistance. Competent authorities should have clear and efficient processes for the prioritization and timely execution of requests, and for safeguarding the information received.”

Table 23: The Statistics of International Information Exchange from 2011 to 2015

Matters	Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Requests from Overseas FIUs	Cases	76	37	41	32	53
	No. of Reports	171	96	113	88	154
Requests to Overseas FIUs	Cases	5	15	16	14	27
	No. of Reports	14	55	61	58	215
Spontaneous Exchanges	Cases	7	22	22	41	42
	No. of Reports	48	48	51	80	67
Questionnaires and Other Matters	Cases	2	0	0	0	0
	No. of Reports	155	78	100	85	201
Total	Cases	90	74	79	87	122
	No. of Reports	388	277	325	311	637

B. Concluding Agreements/MOUs with foreign FIUs



- Photo with Anti-Money Laundering Committee of the Office of the President of the Republic of Panama at the MJIB after signing the crime-fighting cooperation agreement in preventing money laundering, terrorist financing, and the financing of weapons of mass destruction (Mr. Alexis Bethancourt Yau, fifth from left, the Chairman of Panama’s National Anti-Money Laundering Committee, the Ambassador of Panama, sixth from left, and Mr. Zhong-I Wang, the Director General of the MJIB, fifth from right).

Money laundering is usually across-border crime. In order to effectively combat cross-border crime of money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of weapons of mass destruction, it depends on the government of each country to form a consensus and to work together. The MJIB is the Financial Intelligence Unit of Taiwan and strives to contribute in the effort of preventing money laundering. Taiwan had signed the “Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorism Financing Intelligence Exchange Memorandum of Understanding (or Agreement)” with four countries, including Finland, Liechtenstein, Guernsey, and Panama in 2015 in order to lay the foundation for future exchange of intelligence.

C. Sponsoring Nepal FIU to join Egmont Group

Taiwan is a member of the Outreach Working Group (renamed as “Members Support and Compliance Working Group” in February 2016) of the Egmont Group. The core mission of this working group is to sponsor other countries in building a fully functional Financial Intelligence Unit. Taiwan has successfully assisted the Financial Intelligence Unit of Mongolia and Cambodia to become an official member of Egmont Group. The Anti-Money Laundering Division, MJIB and the Anti-Money Laundering Office of Thailand had met in Kathmandu, Nepal to perform a joint preliminary qualification review and subsequently Nepal became an official member of the Egmont Group in 2015.



■ Delegates from Taiwan FIU and Thailand FIU attending a briefing at the Nepal FIU office.



■ Taiwan FIU and Thailand FIU delegates attending the briefing at the Financial Intelligence Unit of Nepal.

PART THREE

Significant Case Studies



- I. Subject Chang and others of Company K suspected of violating the Banking Act
- II. Subject Hsu and others of Company B are suspected of fraud
- III. Subject Huang and others of Medical System C are suspected of perfidy
- IV. A parking lot shooting and murder case

I. Subject Chang and others of Company K are suspected of violating the Banking Act

A. Case Overview

a. Case origin

The MJIB received a suspicious transaction report from Bank A in March 2014 indicating its customer, Company S frequently had many outward remittance transactions arranged through a company account for the reason of “investment in real estate abroad” with a total of NT\$80 million. The actual responsible person of Company S, subject Li, requested to withdraw NT\$4 million in cash from Company S and deposit it in Li’s personal account that was declined by Bank A, and then had the said NT\$4 million deposited in Li’s account at different counter but at the same branch on the same day. Neither Company S nor Li would reveal the source of the funds and the purpose of the transaction to Bank A; therefore, it was considered as a suspicious transaction.

b. Suspects

Chang, the responsible person of Company K;
Li, the responsible persons of Company S.

c. Crime involvement

Chang was the responsible person of Company K for Taiwan. Li was the actual responsible person for 6 companies, including Company S. Li was instructed by an unknown member abroad of Company K to accept and transfer funds for outward remittance. Chang and others of Company K, with some overseas people with Malaysia and Singapore nationalities started to publicize from March 2013 that “Company K” was an affiliated

company of an independent private company in the USA that was engaged in global exchange and gold trading business, and marketing “○○ Fund” investment projects to the public with 3%, 5%, 6%, 7% and 8% “bonus” paid monthly according to the principal amount bracket. The remuneration was with an annual interest rate of 36% -96%; therefore, it attracted a large number of investors to invest. In order to attract more investors to invest, Chang exercised a two-way multilevel marketing system to promote the aforementioned investment program. Each investor should introduce two new members (persons below the promoter) to join the Group and to invest. The “referral bonus” for an amount equivalent to 6% - 10% of the investment amount of the persons below the promoter would be rewarded to the successful introducer.

Chang and others spent large sums to organize large-scale seminars in a number of public places for rapidly developing downstream organizations; also, they had announced to the investors that “Company K” was an affiliated company of a US OTC company and they had offered a high monthly interest rate and high Multi-level Marketing (MLM) bonuses to lure investors to invest. Then again led a large number of investors to participate in the activities of “Company K” in Macau, Bali Indonesia, and Singapore in early August, 2013, mid-September 2014, and on March 22, 2015 so to lure the investors continuing to participate in recruiting the downstream investors.

Li had collected more than NT\$2.68700689 billion from Chang and others in Taiwan by bank transfer or cash collection as above-mentioned. Li had NT\$2.3 billion forwarded to the members of “Company K” by an unknown approach through the accounts controlled by Company S, individuals, and legal persons; also, the remaining NT\$300 million was hidden at an unknown place.

Chang and others had attracted investment members by the aforementioned approach. There were over 1,000 investors invested in “Company K” from March 2013 to the time of the case unveiled, for a grand total of NT\$13.972555 billion.

B. Signs of suspected money laundering

The signs of suspected money laundering include: A large sum of deposits or inward remittances made after the account setup that was irrelevant with the nature of the business. Customers have large sums of money transferred among accounts or have transactions handled in cash (making cash withdrawals to hide the true intent of the account transfer).

C. Indictment

Chang and others were prosecuted by the Taiwan New Taipei City District Court Prosecutors Office in September 2015 for violating the Banking Act, the Multi-level Marketing Act, and the Money Laundering Control Act.

D. Experience sharing

Company S, after opening an account at Bank A, had several out-remittance transactions arranged for an amount of NT\$80 million and was reluctant to disclose the source of the funds and intended use; also, a cash withdrawal was made to hide the true intent of making an account transfer; therefore, it was deemed as a suspicious transaction. The reporting bank noticed the suspicious transaction and then reported it to the MJIB so the case was investigated and solved. The reporting bank's monitoring mechanism for detecting irregular transactions was effective and should be copied by other banks.

II. Subject Hsu and others of Company B are suspected of fraud

A. Case Overview

a. Case origin

The MJIB had received reports in 2014 that subject Hsu, the actual responsible person of Company B, was suspected of committing fraud against investors and money laundering with the use of a paper company.

b. Suspects

Hsu was the actual responsible person of Company B.

c. Crime involvement

Hsu was the actual responsible person of Company B (offshore company) who cooperated with a real estate company in Indonesia for land development project with a paper company (Company E) for unspecific business operation incorporated with a capital stock of US\$1 million invested. Hsu before obtaining qualification for land development and paying the related investment proceeds claimed that Company E had acquired 51% stock shares (equivalent to US\$44 million) of land development in Indonesia and had started soliciting unspecific investors to invest. Hsu for gaining the trust of investors and misleading investors to believe that the land development project was a cooperation with the official had invited Indonesian officials to participate in the meeting in the name of site preparation. Hsu forged money orders to mislead investors to believe that the investment funds had been remitted. After having the investment funds transferred to the bank account of Company E, Hsu had part of the investment funds (down payment) of the investors applied for land development and site preparation, and the remaining investment funds transferred to the account of the offshore company for personal use.

When the syndicate loan for the aforementioned land development project was declined and Company E had a serious fund shortage, investors then realized that Company E had never had US\$44 million transferred to obtain the stock shares of land development and it was a fraud committed by Hsu.

B. Signs of suspected money laundering

There were large amounts transferred in and out of the account right after the account-opening was completed that was obviously inconsistent with the identity of the customer and the income of the customer, and was also irrelevant with the nature of business.

C. Indictment

Hsu was prosecuted for violating Article 339 (fraud) of Criminal Law by Kaohsiung District Court Prosecutors Office in June 2015.

D. Experience sharing

The said crime involved several offshore paper companies and the illegal gains were transferred among these paper companies. The undertaker of the case had compared account statements of many banks and kept close contact with the financial institutions throughout the investigation period to have a comprehensive fund flowchart prepared that was very helpful to the subsequent investigation and understanding the flow of funds.

III. Subject Huang and others of Medical System C are suspected of perfidy

A. Case Overview

a. Case origin

The MJIB handled the suspicious transactions reported by Bank B in December 2012: Company W, a customer of Bank B, after opening a bank account frequently had several large funds transferred in cash with subject Huang that was irrelevant with the business operation of the company that was obviously an abnormal operation.

b. Suspects

Huang and others of Medical System C

c. Crime involvement

Huang was the operating officer of Medical System C and had paid NT\$10,000 per month to hire Chen as the registered responsible person of the paper Company W. Huang invested NT\$5 million as the registered capital stock. Company W was incorporated in March 2010 and had the original direct sale of drugs to Medical System D by the pharmaceuticals company or distributors changed to having the drugs purchase handled by the Purchasing Department of Medical System B collectively for obtaining higher percentage of discount through price negotiation and then the pharmaceuticals company had the drugs sold to Company W first before being sold to Medical System C with 5% - 80% (approximately 30% off the price rated by the National Health Insurance Administration, Ministry of Health and Welfare) of the selling price added.

Huang and others damaged the Medical System C for a sale interest of approximately NT\$300.51602404 million.

B. Signs of suspected money laundering

Customers frequently had multiple large funds transferred in cash (making cash withdrawal to hide the true intent of account transfer) among bank accounts.

C. Indictment

Huang and others was rendered a suspended prosecution for violating Article 342 (perfidy) of Criminal Law by the Taiwan Changhua District Court Prosecutors Office in April 2016.

D. Experience sharing

The crime investigation involving a search and interview was conducted in September 2014 with the account holding around NT\$180 million frozen by Taiwan Changhua District Court Prosecutors Office. A decision of suspended prosecution was rendered to Huang and other defendants, after their confession of the crime, including a fine of NT\$14.5 million to be paid. Also, the MJIB had continuously assisted in checking the flow of funds and staying in touch with the relevant financial institutions. The financial institutions, after media reports, had the suspicious transaction reported to the NJIB and helped have the illegal gains frozen.

IV. A parking lot shooting and murder case

A. Case Overview

a. Case origin

The shooting incident at A parking lot in Ximending with two men killed in a black SUV car was reported by the media on January 14, 2015. The suspect, Chen , was engaged in organized crime and violated the Narcotics Hazard Prevention Act According to the suspected transaction report filed by Bank G, Customer Y was a car salesman and had multiple large funds transferred with Chen that met the criteria of suspicious transactions; therefore, the abnormal transactions were deemed as money laundering.

b. Suspects

Chen and others

c. Crime involvement

Chen was engaged in organized crime and sold drugs for a living. Tsai and a man F were introduced by a friend to buy Class III drug “Ketamine” (referred to as “K-drug” hereinafter) from Chen. It was agreed by both parties to trade a certain amount of Ketamine at the price of NT\$4.4 million. Tsai and F paid NT\$4.4 million in cash in advance and the drug was later delivered at A parking lot. However, there were grudges between the two parties when delivering the drug at A parking lot because Chen was unhappy with Tsai’s scornful expressions during their previous conversations. At the moment Tsai put his hand in his pocket, Chen misunderstood that Tsai was going to take a gun. Therefore, Chen shot Tsai and F to death.

B. Signs of suspected money laundering

The suspects of those special major cases reported on TV, newspapers, magazines, or Internet were not a customer of a Bank; however, there were records of remittances made with the customers of Bank G.

C. Indictment

The MJIB had the information of Chen analyzed and then distributed to Taipei District Court Prosecutors Office and the Criminal Investigation Bureau. Taipei District Court Prosecutors Office continued to investigate the related cash flow of Chen and had successfully tracked down the NT\$4.4 million illicit money and flow of funds that helped Taipei District Court Prosecutors Office and the crime investigation team to hunt for the fugitive, Chen . Taipei District Court Prosecutors Office had Chen prosecuted for a murder charge in May 2015.

D. Experience sharing

Financial institutions should pay attention to news media releases and should file suspicious transaction reports in a timely manner when screening their customers as the suspects of major crime cases, with related subjects remittance transactions records attached. The suspicious transaction reports will help the investigating authorities clarify the fact of criminal cases and trace the hiding assets of suspects, their motives and intent to flee.

PART FOUR

Major Events of the AMLD in 2015



1/19/2015	Assisted Taipei District Court Prosecutors Office and Crime Investigation Division, Taipei City Police Department to investigate the fund flow of Subject Chen, the main suspect of the shooting took place at A parking lot.
1/30/2015	Assigned delegates to attend the fifth “International Anti-Money Laundering Seminar” held by the Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (ACAMS) and Taiwan Academy of Banking and Finance jointly with the reporter designated.
1/24-2/1/2015	Assigned delegates to attend the working group meetings of Egmont Group and signed a MOU with Finland and Liechtenstein at the Berlin working group meeting.
2/2015	Assigned delegates to attend the inter-ministerial group meeting of the Asia/ Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) mutual evaluation held by the Prosecution Division, MOJ.
3/23-27/2015	Invited Dr. Gordon Hook, the Secretary-General of the Secretariat of Asia/ Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), and others to attend the seminar held in Taiwan and visit the Taiwan authorities which with the anti-money laundering responsibility
3/24/2015	Organized the “2015 Mutual Evaluations Seminar –National Risk Assessment and Targeted Financial Sanctions.”
3/31-4/3/2015	Assigned delegates to form a delegation with the International Cooperation Division of Thailand Money Laundering Prevention Office for conducting a field visit in Nepal; also, guiding Nepal to submit the initiation assessment report to the Secretary-General of Egmont Group.
4/14/2015	Assigned delegates to attend the “APG Third Round Mutual Evaluation Meeting” held by the MOJ.

5/29/2015	Assigned delegates to attend the “1st staff meeting of APG Third Round Mutual Evaluation” held by the MOJ.
6/3-10/2015	Director General Wang of the MJIB led a deligation to visit the Financial Analysis Bureau, the Public Affairs Division, the National Police Agency, and the Financial Supervisory Commission, the Republic of Nicaragua as well as the National Anti-Money Laundering Committee of the Office of the President of Panama and the National Police Agency, the Republic of Panama.
6/11-13/2015	Assigned delegates to attend the annual meeting of the Egmont Group in Barbados; also, signed a memorandum of understanding with Guernsey FIU at the meeting.
6/9/2015	Assigned delegates to Executive Yuan to participate in the “Reviewing the MOJ’s ‘Responding to APG Third Round Mutual Evaluation Plan’ meeting.”
6/20-27/2015	Assigned delegates to attend the FATF 3rd meeting of the 26th term in Brisbane, Australia.
7/1/2015	The Delegates from the Legal System Bureau, Ministry of Public Security (MPS), PRC, visited the MJIB and participated in business talks.
7/10-18/2015	Assigned delegates to attend the APG 18 th annual meeting in Auckland, New Zealand.
8/2015	Assigned a senior officer to work at the Secretariat of the Egmont Group.
9/16/2015	Delegates from the Hong Kong Police Office visited the MJIB and attended working meeting.
9/30/2015	Ms. Suwanee Sawang pol, Deputy Secretary-General of Thailand Anti-Money Laundering Office(AMLO) and delegates visited the MJIB and attended working meetings.

10/2/2015	Delegates of AMLD attended the “Directions for Anti-Money Laundering of Electronic Ticket Issuers - the Electronic Ticket Team” conference organized by the Bankers’ Association.
10/5-9/2015	Delegates of AMLD attended the “Hong Kong Police Force 2015 Wealth Investigation International Symposium.”
10/13-14/2015	Delegates of AMLD attend “The 10th Cross-Strait and Hong Kong and Macao Police Seminar” and support the reception service.
10/13/2015	Assigned delegates to attend the “2nd staff meeting of APG Third Round Mutual Evaluation” held by the MOJ.
10/16-25/2015	Assigned delegates to attend the FATF 1st meeting of the 27th term in Paris, France.
10/23/2015	Mr. Ibrahim Hakki Polat, Chairman of the Turkish Financial Crimes Investigation Board, and Kemalettin Kolutek, Director of International Division are invited to visit the MJIB.
11/2-6/2015	Assigned delegates to participate the 2nd annual meeting of the “Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network of Asia/Pacific (ARIN-AP)” in Sydney, Australia.
11/3/2015	Delegates from Public Security Department of Shandong Province, Mainland China visited the MJIB.
11/12-19/2015	Director of AMLD joined the MJIB Delegation to visit Mainland China and participated in the “Public Security, Inspection, and Money Laundering Business meeting.”
11/14-20/2015	Assigned one delegate to attend the “APG Money Laundering Aspects Seminar” in Kathmandu, Nepal.

11/16-20/2015	Delegates of AMLD participated the “Hong Kong Police Force 2015 Wealth Investigation International Symposium - Chinese Seminar.”
11/23-25/2015	Provided with anti-money laundering training programs for Nicaragua and Panama FIU members.
11/23/2015	Participated in the working meeting with the Delegation head by the Director of the Economic Investigation Bureau, MPS, Mainland China.
11/25/2015	Signed the AML/CFT MOU with the Anti-Money Laundering Committee of the Office of the President of the Republic of Panama.
12/10/2015	The AMLD held the 2015 AML/CFT Seminar for Banking Sector.
12/25/2015	Assigned delegates to participate in the “Responding to APG ‘Non-Financial Institution Issues’” meetings at the MOJ.

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